The three are her personal assistant, her romantic partner and her director general.

This suggests the Guptas engineered several channels to the minister, quite apart from any direct communication they may have had with her.

These links, coupled with her refusal to engage with questions about her own conduct, raise the spectre of Brown’s own capture by Gupta-family interests.

Among queries that Brown declined to answer were allegations she had met personally with members of the Gupta family or their close associates, such as Salim Essa, on at least three occasions, including while attending defence exhibitions in the United Arab Emirates, where some of the family is now based.

In response to more than 30 detailed questions, Brown’s spokesperson Colin Cruywagen simply issued a statement passing responsibility to the Hawks.

“Minister Brown is on record supporting the Hawks’ investigations into allegations of corruption published by media over the past month or two… The department has been instructed to assist the probe by making documents and officials available to the investigation as required.”

The PA: Kim Davids

Brown’s personal assistant Kim Davids is at the centre of concerns about Gupta influence.

Davids is the daughter of a close associate of the minister, Michelle McMaster, and has been working with Brown in the Western Cape ANC since 2010.

According to a source familiar with the relationship, Davids exercises significant sway over the minister. Another source said ANC officials in Cape Town had cautioned Brown against taking Davids into the ministry because they viewed her as a loose cannon, but were ignored.

Brown seems to have pulled strings to get her the position.

Davids’ LinkeIn profile suggests she has only a middle-school qualification, but Brown is alleged to have appointed her as a communications director in her department, a post for which a degree is required.

The appointment – a permanent position – gives Davids greater job security and circumvents the usual practice of appointing ministerial staff such as a PA on contract.

Davids is also alleged to have enjoyed influence in areas way beyond her formal role.

An Eskom source said Davids appeared to be more powerful than one would expect from a personal assistant to the point that she would “tackle senior officials” in meetings, “even instructing” them on occasion.

Among the allegations put to Brown was the claim that Davids personally managed the process to select new board appointments to state-owned enterprises during 2015, when some crucial appointments of persons sympathetic to the Guptas were made.

Notable among these was the purge of the Denel board but for one Gupta associate, Johannes “Sparks” Motseki, and the appointment of a new board chaired by Dan Mantsha, whom the #GuptaLeaks have unmasked as another close Gupta associate.

It was put to Brown that Davids’ involvement in the appointment process bypassed established practice and personnel at the public enterprises department. She did not respond.

AmaBhungane previously reported how in about June 2015 the entire Denel board file was uplifted from the department of public enterprises by Brown’s ministerial office and the department was thereafter excluded from the selection process.

Now it appears that Davids was crucial to those events.

Rumours in the department suggested Davids received some board nominations directly from the Guptas or their associates – and was also in regular communication with them.

Neither Brown nor Davids responded to this allegation, but the #GuptaLeaks emails provide some substantiation for those suspicions.

They show that Davids approached Essa, the Gupta lieutenant, in April 2015, apparently about sponsoring a software training course in India for her husband-to-be, Diego Mateus.

Essa forwarded the request to Tony Gupta.

Then, in December 2015 Kim Davids flew to Dubai and stayed at the Oberoi hotel between 27 December 2015 and 1 January 2016.

The bill was AED 9,100 (about R32,000) and was forwarded to Tony Gupta to approve payment. [LINK]

The emails also show that a limousine was booked to take Davids to the Gupta residence in the exclusive Emirates Hills estate.

Neither Brown nor Davids responded to questions about the visit, but Davids insists there was nothing untoward about her trip.

In an emailed statement, she said: “In December 2015, I took leave and booked a holiday with my fiancé [Mateus] in Portugal. On the way, in transit in Dubai, I fell ill, when I learned I was pregnant. We returned home, paying our own costs. I reject with contempt those unfounded allegations that cast doubt on my integrity.”

However, the #GuptaLeaks directly contradict Davids, showing that a reservation for “Kim David” was made by Gupta executive Ashu Chawla already on 22 December, five days before her supposedly unplanned arrival on 27 December. [LINK]

The day before her arrival, on the morning of 26 December, the emails show that Essa was assuring Chawla that Davids would be arriving early at the hotel the next day, about 9am.

The partner: Ingrid Tufvesson

Davids’ sister and mother are also former business associates of Ingrid Tufvesson, Brown’s romantic partner.

Brown has had a longstanding relationship with Tufvesson, a higher education academic and transformation consultant.

Tufvesson is a director of a company called Sores OMS, which appears to have two connections with the Gupta family.

Company registration records show Soo Young “Heather” Jeon was appointed a director of the company on 2 November 2015 – the same day as Tufvesson – and then was removed on 30 November 2015.

Jeon is a director of a number of companies in the Gupta stable and the #GuptaLeaks show she is a trusted agent for them in Dubai.

The other remaining director in Sores OMS, also appointed on the same day as Tufvesson, is the wife of a Balkan diplomat based in India. The #GuptaLeaks show the diplomat and his wife have been guests of the Gupta family in South Africa, and that the husband sent the wife’s CV to Tony Gupta a few months after.

Both the minister and Tufvesson were invited to explain the connection to Jeon and the diplomat’s wife, but failed to do so.

Neither responded to these specific questions but Tufvesson told amaBhungane: “I am a private person, who is doing my best with limited means to support myself and my dependents singlehandedly.

“This being said, I want to categorically state on record that other than what I read or see about the Guptas in the media I have never met them personally, have not had any dealings with them, and have not been approached in any way, shape or form on their behalf.

“To the best of my knowledge, I do not know whether any of the persons I have had contact with in my business endeavours ever had dealings with the Guptas. If they did, they never told me about the same, nor was this issue ever raised with me in any form or fashion as revelations about the Guptas are relatively new in the media.

“All my recent and relevant business interests, assets and liabilities have been legally disclosed to government last year per the required protocols and nothing has changed yet, except that my savings have been reduced.”

The DG: Richard Seleke

On 5 November 2015, a routine cabinet statement revealed that an obscure Free State bureaucrat, Richard Seleke, had been appointed the new director-general of the public enterprises department.

At the time, he was the head of the Free State department of economic development. Mosebenzi Zwane had been his MEC until until September 2015, when Zwane was unexpectedly elevated to become national minister of mineral resources, seemingly at the behest of the Guptas.

As we have previously reported, the #Guptaleaks show Seleke’s CV was emailed to the president’s son, Duduzane Zuma, on 29 June 2015. The email was forwarded from an anonymous address using the pseudonym “infoportal1”.

The forwarded email contained the words: “Evening sir please find attached my CV and supporting documents. Regards, Richard.”

Seleke has issued a curious half denial about this exchange. He told the Sunday Times, which first reported the email: “That is not my e-mail address. Lots of people have my CV and I cannot be held accountable for things which I have no control over.”

In fact other emails suggest “infoportal1” was used by Salim Essa or Tony Gupta, meaning Seleke might have sent his email to this anonymised address to hide his tracks.

Pertinently, neither Brown nor Seleke responded when challenged to deny that he sent such an email containing his CV on the date in question.

But Seleke challenged the Sunday Times to find fault with the way he was appointed: “I was moved from the position of DG at economic affairs to this one without a cent raise,” he was reported as saying.

In fact, there are serious question marks relating to the way Seleke was appointed.

Among the allegations posed to Seleke and Brown was the claim that the Guptas or their associates had proposed Seleke as a candidate after the post had been advertised and applications closed.

On top of that, the panel set up to interview Seleke included his former boss, Zwane, who was one of Seleke’s referees on his CV, though Zwane’s potentially irregular inclusion was stopped by Brown.

They didn’t respond to these allegations either.

Brown and the Guptas

The minister has been evasive about her own relationship with the Guptas.

At a press conference in April 2016 she stated that she had once met one of the brothers about 15 years before, implying, but not saying, that this was the only time.

In May 2016, the minister was asked a detailed parliamentary question about any meetings she may have had with the Guptas or their employees or close associates. The minister evaded this question by replying merely that “the duties of ministers and deputy ministers are outlined in the ministerial handbook”.

Now Brown again evaded answering questions we put to her, including that she met the Guptas when she attended a defence exhibition in Abu Dhabi in February 2015, the Dubai Airshow in November 2015 and at least once in Gauteng and once in Cape Town since her appointment as minister.

Brown’s appointment of compromised directors

AmaBhungane has previously reported extensively on questionable appointments to the boards of state owned companies – notably Denel, Eskom and Transnet – during Brown’s tenure.

The minister has defended her appointments and attempted to shift responsibility for her choices to cabinet and the ANC, though, legally, the responsibility is hers.

Since then, numerous directors at Eskom have resigned following the exposure of their ties to the Gupta circle.

They include former Eskom chief executive Brian Molefe and former chairman Ben Ngubane, now shown to have intervened repeatedly to benefit the Gupta purchase of Optimum Coal; Mark Pamensky, who gave the Guptas advice about their deals with Eskom despite being on the Eskom board; Nazia Carrim, who is married to Essa’s cousin and was contracted by Essa to draw up Duduzane Zuma’s antenuptial contract; and Viroshini Naidoo, who is married to Essa’s close associate Kuben Moodley.

Brown’s culpability has since been underlined by the #GuptaLeaks, a report by Advocate Geoff Budlender, the public protector’s State of Capture report and other disclosures.

Matters that stand out include her acquiescence in the re-appointment of Molefe as the chief executive of Eskom, which ultimately backfired – as well as her failure to act against Denel chair Mantsha or Eskom chief financial officer Anoj Singh, despite the #GuptaLeaks having exposed Singh and Mantsha as compromised.

Mantsha appears to have been captured by the Guptas, with emails showing he sent them a municipal bill, enjoyed extensive travel and hotel stays at their expense and shared confidential government documents with them or their agents.

He remains in his position.

Last week the Eskom board finally suspended Singh, with Brown and Finance Minister Malusi Gigaba’s concurrence, but reportedly only after massive pressure from Eskom lenders.

As chief financial officer, Singh’s job included the duty to “act with fidelity, honesty, integrity and in the best interests of the public entity in managing the financial affairs of the public entity”.

Yet, under his watch, Transnet signed a contract with communications company Neotel, after which millions were kicked back to the Guptas via a front company called Homix.

Transnet also awarded contracts to China South Rail in a series of locomotive contracts, for which billions were to be kicked back to the Guptas.

At both Transnet and Eskom, Singh oversaw the payment of hundreds of millions to Essa’s Trillian – without contracts.

After he arrived at Eskom, the company helped the Guptas to buy Optimum, by placing pressure on its previous owner, issuing a R1.6-billion bank guarantee and providing a prepayment for coal.

Contemporaneously, he enjoyed multiple luxury trips to Dubai, bankrolled by the Guptas.

AmaBhungane put it to Brown that the pattern was simply too consistent to be a coincidence.

The responsibility for the ruinous management of state owned companies was hers, yet she had repeatedly failed to take the public into her confidence regarding the process and rationale behind such tainted appointments.

We asked: “Why should we not conclude that the minister herself has been captured by the Guptas and their associates?”

Brown’s spokesperson said Brown was “the first member of the executive to call for further investigation into the former Public Protector’s State of Capture Report”.

“Proper investigative processes are the only mechanisms that can lift the clouds hanging over state owned companies – and by extension, over the sovereign.”

The Gupta family has consistently failed to respond to our questions regarding the #GuptaLeaks.

• • The amaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism is an independent non-profit. Be an amaB supporter to help it do more. Sign up for its newsletter to get more.
  • Scorpio is the Daily Maverick’s new investigative unit. If you’d like to support its work, click here.

  

After Matjila was appointed, Gupta-owned TNA Media scored lucrative deals with the power utility.

On March 22, 2014, Gupta associate Salim Essa circulated Matjila’s CV via mail to Gupta brother Rajesh, better known as Tony, and his nephew Srikant Singhala, son of Atul Gupta.

The CV was then forwarded to an employee of the Guptas’ Sahara Computers and Duduzane Zuma – President Jacob Zuma’s son and a business partner of the Guptas.

At the end of that month Matjila, who had been on the Eskom board since 2011, replaced Brian Dames as CEO in an acting capacity. His short tenure would soon turn into a boon to the Guptas’ TNA Media, publisher of the overtly pro-government newspaper The New Age.

In October 2014, amaBhungane reported that “Matjila allegedly disregarded internal legal advice and approved a budget-busting R43-million New Age business breakfasts sponsorship”.

The business breakfasts, now reportedly being cancelled by the SABC, were regularly broadcast live on the state broadcaster at its expense. They featured prominent political figures, including President Jacob Zuma.

Those widely seen to be in the Zuma camp and close to the Guptas are heavily represented at these events, which have raked in large sponsorships from state-owned entities and which industry experts say are a major money spinner for an otherwise struggling newspaper.

Now, the leaked emails corroborate amaBhungane’s previous report of the exorbitant sums Matjila lavished on the The New Age’s flagship television show, and at a time when the power utility could ill afford it.

On 4 April 2014, just after Matjila had moved into his new role, an email containing a proposal for renewing and expanding Eskom’s sponsorship of the business breakfasts was sent from Nazeem Howa, the CEO of Gupta-owned Oakbay Investments, to another Gupta employee, Ashu Chawla.

The proposal, dated to the previous month and addressed to Chose Choeu, Eskom’s executive for corporate affairs, reads: “It is with pleasure that we submit the following proposal for the period 1 April 2014 to 31 March 2015 for sponsorship of 12 Business Briefings for a total investment of R14,400,000.00, excluding VAT and agency commission.”

Email correspondence from about a month after the proposal was circulated shows TNA Media’s business development manager Wiedaad Taliep and Eskom’s Choeu arranging a meeting to “discuss the breakfasts logistics and related issues”.

On 6 May, Chose wrote that the “the contract has been signed by our CEO”, referring to the business breakfasts.

That correspondence was then forwarded to Atul Gupta.

The amaBhungane report from later that year stated that “the new contract for R43-million allegedly approved by Matjila commits Eskom to sponsoring roughly one monthly briefing for three years”.

If the R14.4-million cited in the proposed contract were to be extended to three years the figure would be almost identical to the alleged R43-million.

That report alleged that the final contract was especially onerous because it did not contain an exit clause – something that Eskom’s lawyers had allegedly raised with Matjila before he signed off on it.

The deal caused such concern at board level that the chair of its audit and risk subcommittee raised the alarm with Public Enterprises Minister Lynne Brown.

At around the same time as the business breakfast deal was being hammered out, Eskom also entered into a new contract for the bulk buying of copies of The New Age.

Attached to the same email containing the business breakfast proposal was a newspaper subscription agreement between Eskom and TNA Media, effective 1 May, 2014.

The unsigned copy of the agreement committed Eskom to purchase 4,000 daily copies of the The New Age over a period of 36 months. The cost was calculated at the full cover price of R3.50 at 256 publishing days per year, plus 50 cents on each paper for delivery.

The total cost for a year’s subscription: R4,096,000. No discount was offered on the cover price – highly unusual for such a large purchase.

The agreement tied Eskom down by stating that it shall remain “in full force and effect indefinitely” unless either party were to terminate it by “giving to the other Party six months’ written notice of termination”.

The TNA business model relies heavily on government contracts for advertising and subscriptions.

Previous amaBhungane reports, citing data from global market research firm Nielsen, showed that ad-spend from government and state-owned companies has propped up The New Age.

The paper receives a disproportionate share of government ad-spend while the private sector has been largely unwilling to advertise in a paper that does not release comprehensive audits of its circulation figures.

The Guptas’ government-focused business strategy was stated unambiguously in recently leaked emails concerning a plan to take over the Mail & Guardian newspaper.

The emails show that the plan to make the Mail & Guardian profitable was to steer it in the same direction as The New Age – adopt a pro-government editorial position and attract government ad-spend.

According to Nielsen figures, this approach netted The New Age R2.2-million worth of advertising from South African Airways, R3.4-million from the SABC, and R4.5-million from Transnet for the year ending 31 October, 2016.

Fin24 reported in 2015 that SAA had spent R9.4-million to purchase nearly six million copies of the paper.

For Eskom, relations with TNA Media did not begin when Matjila took the helm. The utility has publicly stated that it had dealings with The New Age since 2011, and between 2011 and early 2014 it had spent at least R12-million on 10 business breakfasts.

But Matjila appears to have been particularly eager in dispensing largesse to the Guptas, and this in a year when the cash-strapped state-owned company faced major delays and cost overruns with new power station construction, was on the brink of another load shedding crisis, and was desperate for a bailout after a shortfall of hundreds of billions of rand.

Asked if the volume of Eskom’s expenditure on The New Age could constitute wasteful expenditure, Eskom gave the following generic response: “Regarding the incidence of fruitless and wasteful expenditure in general, Eskom regularly reviews its internal control processes to minimise the risk, and where an incident occurs Management takes appropriate measures to deal with the matter, including disciplinary action and/or criminal or civil action against those involved, as considered appropriate.”

Eskom did not answer detailed questions, including those regarding the role of Matjila. It also did not respond to follow-up questions.

Gupta lawyer and regular spokesperson Gert van der Merwe has refused to comment on #GuptaLeaks claims, saying: “I have no documents or context or instructions. It is inappropriate.”

Gupta Link

Matjila’s link to the Guptas can be traced back to his chequered history as chief executive of Cosatu investment company Kopano ke Matla, where he was implicated in a number of cases of financial mismanagement before resigning in 2014 when he took up his executive position at Eskom.

Under his watch at Kopano ke Matla the Financial Services Board picked up a web of suspicious payments including one of R1.3-million to a company he owned. In response, Matjila told the FSB the payments were “personal commissions”.

Cosatu also commissioned its own forensic report in 2013 in an attempt to get to the bottom of numerous allegations of financial misconduct at its investment arm.

This showed that Matjila had only handed over a summary of the FSB report to Cosatu while he sat on the full report.

The Cosatu report also alleged that Matjila undersold an old Cosatu property by as much as R9.5-million, and paid an inflated price for a new property – R6.3-million more than it was worth.

It found that the task team led by Matjila that negotiated the property transactions was “informally assisted” by Essa, the Gupta associate who sent Matjila’s CV to Tony Gupta. It added that Kopano had previously worked with Essa through Inca Energy, an entity jointly owned by Kopano and Essa.

Chequered Past

Matjila’s tenure at Eskom, first as member of the board’s tender subcommittee and then as acting CEO, was also marked by his involvement in the awarding of a controversial R4-billion contract to replace ageing steam generators at Koeberg nuclear power station.

The never-ending tender would drag on for years as Matjila and other political appointees at board and ministerial level appeared to use every opportunity to block the bidder preferred by Eskom’s technical teams.

The tender was originally awarded in 2011, with the lion’s share going to Japanese-American corporation Westinghouse, and a smaller portion of the deal going to its French rival Areva. But it was halted by then public enterprises minister Malusi Gigaba, who claimed that Eskom had not received ministerial approval.

Eskom reopened the tender process in 2012 and the following year Eskom’s technical team reaffirmed its choice of Westinghouse as the preferred bidder. But when its decision was taken to the board’s tender subcommittee, then chaired by Matjila, it stalled again.

Matjila appeared to be creating a parallel tender process by bringing in external consultants who reported to him and contradicted the work of the Eskom technical team and backed Areva.

As the process dragged on into the second half of 2014 Matjila, then acting CEO, and Matshela Koko, acting group executive for technology and commercial, co-signed an unsolicited memo recommending Areva.

Despite Eskom’s technocrats continuing to support the cheaper Westinghouse bid, the tender committee awarded the contract to Areva. After a drawn-out legal challenge by Westinghouse, the Constitutional Court ruled against setting aside the tender award to Areva.

AmaBhungane tried numerous times to contact Matjila on several phone numbers linked to him. He did not answer, nor did he respond to text messages.

• The amaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism is an independent non-profit. Be an amaB supporter to help it do more. Sign up for its newsletter to get more.
• Scorpio is the Daily Maverick’s new investigative unit. If you’d like to support its work, click here.

The #GuptaLeaks show:

• The Guptas tried to sell Denel’s intellectual property to India, while watering the state arms company’s stake down by half.
• Acting as middlemen, they took the biggest stake for themselves and cut in a powerful Indian tycoon – close to Prime Minister Narendra Modi – for his “influence”.
• They primed, wined and dined Denel’s then new chairman, Dan Mantsha, who sent them confidential government documents.
  

The Gupta family set themselves up to sell state arms manufacturer Denel’s weapons to India in a deal involving a shady Indian fixer and a powerful tycoon close to prime minister Narendra Modi.

The Guptas arranged to sideline Denel and take the biggest share for themselves even though it was Denel’s proprietary technology that was to be sold.

These details are revealed in the #GuptaLeaks, a trove of electronic data sourced from the heart of the Guptas’ business empire.

In January 2016, Denel announced the formation of Denel Asia, a Hong Kong-based joint venture that it controlled, holding 51%. The rest belonged to a company registered to Gupta lieutenant Salim Essa.

Defending themselves against criticism at the time, Denel and the Guptas claimed that the Gupta family had no interest in the Essa company, VR Laser Asia, and by implication in Denel Asia.

The #GuptaLeaks show they were misleading South Africans. Emails in the trove show Denel officials knew the overriding purpose of setting up Denel Asia was to sell arms to India – targeting more than US$8-billion in deals there – via a second joint venture called Denel India.

In Denel India, Denel’s participation was watered down to just 25%. The Guptas, who brought little to the table besides their political connectivity in South Africa and India, planned to wield a controlling 42% stake – exercised via Essa and their brother-in-law, Anil Gupta.

Anil, a former minister in the Indian state of Uttarakhand, is married to Achla, the Gupta brothers’ sister. The controversial Gupta wedding at Sun City celebrated the marriage of Anil and Achla’s daughter, Vega.

The files contain emails and draft contracts that show that as Denel Asia was being established in Hong Kong, the Guptas were putting together a second-tier company in India called Denel India, in which their Indian brother-in-law would hold a significant stake.

• Read the Denel #GuptaLeaks ​here.

They also show the Guptas had a direct involvement in the establishment of Denel Asia, suggesting Essa was little more than their proxy.

Denel India was to be owned by Denel (25%) and Essa (24%) via Denel Asia, as well as Anil Gupta (18%) and the Indian multinational Adani Enterprises (33%).

Thus, Denel’s participation was to be diluted significantly – and the emails show Denel executives were well aware the company would enjoy only a minority stake in the Indian venture.

Adani was key to the plan, the emails suggest.

Its billionaire founder and chairman, Gautam Adani, is often reported to be close to Modi, the prime minister.

Much like the Guptas and President Jacob Zuma in South Africa, commentators link the rise of Adani’s business empire to the political rise of Modi, starting in the early 2000s when Adani supported Modi when he was politically weak.

In one 2016 email, the CEO of the Gupta-owned VR Laser in South Africa, Pieter van der Merwe, objected to a draft contract in which Adani suggested it use nominee shareholders.

Van der Merwe made Adani’s role clear: “We are entering into an agreement with [Adani] as a result of their name, history and connections. If it means they are going to appoint an affiliate who doesn’t have any know-how or influence, we do not need a partnership.”

Companies in the Adani group have been accused by Indian authorities of money laundering and tax avoidance to the tune of about US$750-million.

Adani did not respond to an emailed request for comment.

But it was another controversial Indian businessman who appeared to introduce the Guptas to Adani: Kolkata businessman Parasmal Lodha.

Indian authorities recently arrested Lodha for money laundering. He was released on bail last week. Lodha is very close to the Guptas, the #Guptaleaks show.

They attend each other’s family weddings and holidays and a senior Gupta manager once used contacts in the department of home affairs to arrange a South African visa for Lodha.

It was Lodha who in 2013 emailed Tony Gupta, asking him to invite Gautam Adani, among “a few friends”, to another Gupta wedding, this time of Anil Gupta’s son.

In 2015, as the Guptas were assembling their partnership with Denel and Adani, Lodha reviewed an Adani Enterprises contract within the Denel India structure and emailed comments to Tony Gupta.

Around the same time, Lodha twice helped to arrange for Gautam Adani to visit South Africa. Lodha did not respond to questions.

The involvement of tainted figures such as Lodha and politically exposed persons such as Adani – along with Essa and the Gupta family – suggest Denel was willing to pursue a recklessly high-risk strategy.

Denel was previously blacklisted from selling arms to India because it had used commissioned agents, a banned practice there.

However, the Denel Asia and Denel India structures circumvented this by including the Guptas – effectively Denel’s agents – within the company structures.

After amaBhungane first wrote about Denel Asia in early 2016, the national treasury confirmed that it viewed the partnership to be illegal.

It said it had not approved the deal under the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA). Denel publicly disagreed and is now suing treasury and the finance minister.

In a court affidavit, former treasury head Lungisa Fuzile said that in its PFMA application, Denel “discusses two potential partners in India: Adani Group and PIPAVAV, both of which are leading Indian conglomerates expanding into the defence industry. It is not clear why these companies were overlooked by [Denel] in their review of the market and what led [Denel] to the conclusion that VR Laser Asia was the most suitable partner.”

The implication seems to be that he too was concerned that the Guptas were simply inserted as agents – although it was via taking a stake in a Denel subsidiary, rather than receiving a fee.

A Denel spokesperson said: “We have been advised that the Hawks are carrying out an investigation on the matters pertaining to the #GuptaLeaks emails. We would rather give space to the Hawks to undertake their investigations on all these matters fully before making any comments.”

Gupta lawyer and regular spokesperson Gert van der Merwe has refused to comment on #GuptaLeaks claims, saying: “I have no documents or context or instructions. It is inappropriate.”

The #Guptaleaks suggest the Guptas pursued an intricate plan to push their Denel project through, involving inside information and the positioning of sympathetic decision-makers, including four-day finance minister Des van Rooyen.

They contain a number of email threads in which intricate details of the Denel Asia joint-venture are discussed between October 2015 and February 2016. Inevitably, these lines of correspondence ended up on Tony Gupta’s or Gupta managers’ desks.

For example, the PFMA required Denel to get permission from the ministers of public enterprises and finance before it can strike up a public-private partnership like Denel Asia, which consisted of state-owned Denel on the one hand, and privately owned VR Laser on the other.

One day after Denel submitted its PFMA application to treasury on 30 October 2015, Denel chairman Dan Mantsha forwarded the confidential document to Ashu Chawla, a senior Gupta executive.

The #GuptaLeaks have already exposed how the Guptas hosted Mantsha on lavish trips to Dubai.

But the timing of his meetings and communications with the family and their factotums adds to the impression he was their cats-paw.

On 24 July 2015, Public Enterprises Minister Lynne Brown announced sweeping changes to Denel’s non-executive board, leaving only Gupta beneficiary Nkopane “Sparks” Motseki in place and removing experienced directors in favour of relative unknowns.

Key among them was Mantsha, appointed as the new chair of Denel, despite that fact he was struck off as an attorney in 2007 and only re-admitted in 2011.

Just days after his appointment, on 3 August, Mantsha forwarded a copy of his outstanding municipal account for R14,238 to Gupta lieutenant Ashu Chawla.

The same account was again forwarded to Mr. Chawla in October. Both were marked “for your urgent attention.”

By 5 August the emails show Mantsha was listed to join Tony Gupta and others on a flight from Johannesburg to Mumbai aboard the Guptas’ private jet ZS-OAK.

It is not clear if he was aboard, but he was booked a room with the family at the ITC hotel in Mumbai for 6 and 7 August and he was listed as a passenger for the subsequent Mumbai-Delhi and Delhi-Johannesburg legs. A few weeks after his return from this jaunt, the new Denel board moved against the existing Denel executive.

On 24 September, the board suspended chief executive Riaz Saloojee, financial director Fikile Mkhontlo, and company secretary Elizabeth Africa. (Since then their supposed disciplinary infractions have all melted away and they have been paid severance packages.)

By 29 September, Chawla was handling the application for a Dubai visa for Mantsha and by the next day the Guptas’ travel agent had booked a business class ticket from Dubai to Johannesburg for him, invoiced to a Gupta company for R33,280.

Mantsha failed to respond to detailed questions about his relationship with the Guptas. But Mantsha was also not the only source the Guptas had providing top-level intelligence on the Denel project.

On 23 November, Public Enterprises Minister Lynne Brown provisionally approved Denel’s negotiations with VR Laser Asia to form Denel Asia. One day later, the emails show, Chawla had a copy of her approval.

A few days later, Denel chairman Mantsha sent the same confidential document to Chawla.

To its PFMA application to Minister Brown, Denel attached a spreadsheet of “opportunities that Denel feels confident will be secured jointly with VR Laser Asia”.

This detailed US$9.3-billion worth of potential weapons deals in the region. Of this, US$8.2-billion would be sourced from India. From November 26 to 29, the Guptas’ chosen Indian partner, Adani, was their guest in South Africa.

Mumbai fixer Lodha was instrumental in the arrangements and the emails show his assistant wrote to an Adani staffer noting: “Meeting with the [South African] President, Ministers and CEOs of mining, power and port has been arrange (sic) on 27th and 28th… Car and necessary security will be arrange (sic) by Mr Gupta.”

By this time the Guptas were already shopping for a new finance minister, according to evidence provided to the public protector, and it seems they wanted the Denel Asia joint venture PFMA application to be on his desk when he landed.

Although Brown at public enterprises had given provisional approval, the law required the finance minister to approve the joint venture too.

The #Guptaleaks show that on 7 December, Chawla emailed a copy of Brown’s in-principle approval and briefing document directly to the finance minister’s personal assistant.

On that day, the minister was still Nhlanhla Nene, but three days later, on 10 December, it was Des van Rooyen.

The very next day Denel submitted its formal PFMA application for Denel Asia to the new finance minister, according to an affidavit delivered in the high court dispute between Denel and treasury over the establishment of the Hong Kong joint venture.

Van Rooyen was removed on 13 December before he could approve Denel Asia – and the status of the joint venture has been in dispute ever since. That didn’t stop the Guptas from trying to forge ahead.

After Van Rooyen’s sacking, Mantsha joined a procession of influential figures in a pilgrimage to the Oberoi hotel in Dubai and an audience with the Guptas at their new R325-million pad.

Invoices from the #Guptaleaks show he stayed at the Oberoi between 3 and 6 January 2016 at the expense of the Guptas’ Sahara Computers and was chauffeured to their home at L35 Emirates Hills.

Mantsha failed to respond to questions about the purpose of the visit, but presumably it was to regroup.

During this time VR Laser SA chief executive Van der Merwe, Tony Gupta and others continued to exchange thoughts on draft contracts with Adani Enterprises, the emails show.

In one instance, Van der Merwe forwarded to Tony Gupta a chain of correspondence between himself and Denel officials in which they debated whether or not Denel India, the Denel Asia joint venture with Adani, was separately subject to the PFMA.

He said Denel and VR Laser had previously agreed that when Denel applied to the ministers of finance and public enterprises for consent, their planned new Indian company should be disclosed so “as to play open cards with what the parties intend to do”.

And to Tony Gupta, Van der Merwe complained: “They are missing the point and the reason why we entered into this transaction. In the private sector, time is of the essence. This is the basis on which we have decided to invest in a funding facility.”

In a February 2016 email to colleagues – after they received questions from amaBhungane – VR Laser CEO Van der Merwe explained that the SA VR Laser was going to loan Denel Asia R20-million a year for five years to cover certain costs.

The terms of this loan have never been explained, but it is clear from the #GuptaLeaks and court records that the plan was for Denel Asia to repay it.

On 5 February 2016 amaBhungane broke the story of the Guptas’ involvement in Denel Asia and treasury began issuing the first of a series of statements questioning the legality of the joint venture.

Denel appeared undaunted.

On 24 February Denel’s acting chief executive Zwelakhe Ntshepe signed a board memorandum recording Denel’s approval to negotiate the formation of Denel India, in which Denel Asia would have 49% and Adani Enterprises 51%.

Two days later he jetted off on another Gupta jet, ZS-AKG, bound for the Indian city of Goa, which was hosting the 2016 Defexpo, a defence trade show. Denel’s exhibition stand was confidently hosted under the banner of “Denel Asia” – a company that barely existed but promised a turn-over of billions.

Now those dreams are shattered.

• The amaBhungane Centre for Investigative Journalism is an independent non-profit. Be an amaB supporter to help it do more. Sign up for its newsletter to get more.
• Scorpio is the Daily Maverick’s new investigative unit. If you’d like to support its work, click here.